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VOLUME IX. OCTOBER, 1934 NUMBER 3
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
IN WASHINGTON*
JosEPH WARREN GREENOUGH
LESLIm J. Ay
SuBDn sION FouR
Subdivision four of Section 24 provides
"No corporation shall pay dividends (a) in cash or prop-
erty, 22 except from the surplus of the aggregate of its
assets over the aggregate of its liabilities, including in the
latter the amount of its capital stock, after deducting from
such aggregate of its assets and the amount by which such
aggregate was increased by unrealized appreciation in
value or revaluation of fixed assets, (b) in shares of the
corporation, except from the surplus of the aggregate of
its assets over the aggregate of its liabilities, including in
the. latter the amount of its capital stock."
The assets of the corporation must be reduced by the deduc-
tions required under subdivision three and by the total of the cor
poration's liabilities, including the amount of its capital stock,
before a surplus is available for distribution by way of either
cash or stock dividend. But, though the funds available for stock
dividends are subject to no other limitations in the Act, cash divi-
dends are hedged about with the further restriction of this sub-
division that they shall not be based on the unrealized appreciation
of fixed assets and by the analogous provisions in regard to cur-
rent assets imposed in subdivision four, snfra.
Why are unrealized appreciation of fixed assets and unrealized
profits on current assets made a proper basis of stock dividends,
while similar items are barred as a source of cash dividends9 We
will first turn attention to the propriety of cash or stock dividends
from unrealized appreciation of fixed assets.
It was well settled in America before the Act that unrealized
appreciation in fixed assets could not give rise to cash divi-
*Continued from last issue.
2' Cash and property dividends are treated alike. Liebman v. Auto
Strop Co., 241 N. Y. 427, 150 N. E. 505 (1926)
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dends.1"' In Kingston v. Home L'ife Insurance Company,124 the
Chancellor said
" an estimated increase in the value of the building
is not a net profit arising from the business of the
company its increased value when realized by a sale
may perhaps be treated as a profit, but until realized it
is surely unwise, inaccurate and wrong to so regard it
and pay out money based on such an estimate, for it is
only a guess, and if a correct one it may become incorrect
later when the conditions which produced the estimated
increase value change."'12
Revaluation of a building site was held not to give rise to a sur-
plus out of which a cash dividend could be paid in the recent
case of Wilson v. Barnett,"' though the force of the decision was
diminished by the directors' failure to prove that they acted on
the basis of expert appraisals. Support is also given by the tax
case holdings that unrealized appreciation does not constitute m-
come.
127
On the other hand, there is little doubt but that stock dim-
dends were allowed to be based on unrealized appreciation of fixed
assets before the Act."28 In Northern Bank & Trust Company v.
Day"' the valuation of a boat used by a fishing company was
increased by the directors from $15,000 to $20,000 and the result-
ing surplus of $5,000 used as a basis of a stock dividend. The
good faith of the directors was not questioned, because the boat
was purchased at $22,500, although the organizers originally fixed
its value arbitrarily at $15,000. The dividend was held proper
in an action brought against the directors by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the corporation. No distinction was drawn by the
Washington court between cash and stock dividends, however, so
1"Dealer's Granite Corp. v. Faubson (Texas Civ. Ap. 1929), 18 S. W(2d) 737 (1929),Southern Calif. Home Builders v. Young, 45 Calif. App.
679, 188 Pac. 586 (1920) Coleman v Booth, supra, note 62; 7 Thompson,
op. cit. supra, note 9, sec. 5292. Cf. Cole v. Adams, 19 Tex. Civ. App. Rep.
507, 49 S. W 1052 (1898).
121 1 Del. Ch. 258, 101 Atl. 898 (1917).
"IbI. at 101 AtI. 904.
"Reported in N. Y. L. J., August 2, 1928.
- Eisner v. Macomber 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920) Gray v.
Darlington, 82 U. S. 63, 21 Law Ed. 45 (1872).
"Weiner and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 47 at 983. And one
writer says "In determining whether or not dividends may be made
from unrealized capital appreciation, dividends other than in cash or
property are not concerned, as stock dividends and the like may be de-
clared without distributing corporation assets," Hills, Dividends from
Unrealized Capital Appreciation, 6 N. Y. L. R. 193, at 194 (1928).
1 83 Wash. 296, 145 Pac. 182 (1915).
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the decision is not authority for the proposition that cash div-
dends can not be paid out of unrealized appreciation of fixed
assets. In fact, the language indicates that creditors can not
attack the validity of any sort of dividend based on revaluation
of assets if the revaluation be bona fide. Though legality of a
dividend was not the issue, the case of State ex rel. Attorney Gen-
eral v. Bray 30 is interesting. Quo warranto proceedings to oust
a corporation of its charter were brought by the Attorney General
of Missouri on the theory that the corporation had illegally issued
stock. The issue in question arose from the declaration of a stock
dividend based upon an unrealized appreciation in the value of
the corporation's real estate and other fixed assets and the
accompanying increase in corporation stock. A special commis-
sioner found that the "net fair cash value" at reproduction cost
was in excess of the new stock issue, and the Supreme Court, sit-
ting en bane in the original proceedings therefore disnssed it.
The allowance of stock dividends out of unrealized apprecia-
tion of fixed assets seems never to have been satisfactorily ex-
plained. Mr. Weiner and Air. Bonbright remark:131
"The conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that the
Ohio Committee and the Commissioners on Uniform Law
were merely codifying pre-existing law Apparently they
were not aware of this fact, nor have we been able to
find any statement of this rule in the treatises. Pos-
sibly because of the general ignorance of this rule, its
wisdom seems never to have been critically considered.
Re-examination of it in the light of modern financial prac-
tice seems highly desirable."
The attitude of the statutes in this respect is said by the same
men to be one of compromise.,3 2 The objection to treating unreal-
ized appreciation of fixed assets as an earning is forcefully ad-
823 Mo. 562, 20 S. W (2d) 56 (1929).
"'Weiner and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 983.
" "The major issue of unrealized appreciation or loss is still almost
wholly untouched. The tendency of the courts has unquestionably been
to frown upon dividends based on unrealized appreciation. In this they
have the enthusiastic support of most accountants, who refuse to con-
sider unrealized appreciation as profits, and are reluctant even to record
it on the books as a capital gain. The most recent statutes have adopted
in this respect a compromise attitude. They permit such appreciation
to be made a basis for stock dividends, but not for cash dividends. This
position has the support of all the decided cases, although these cases
may require re-examination in view of the recent practice of paying reg-
ular stock dividends." Weiner and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 47,
at 985.
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vanced m the case of La Belle Iron Works v. United States.1 2
Though the ease involves taxes, it is not wholly foreign to our
discussion. Said the opinion
"There is a logical incongruity in entering upon the
books of a corporation as the capital value of property
acquired for permanent employment in its business and
still retained for that purpose, a sum corresponding not to
its cost, but to what probably might be realized by sale in
the market. It is not merely that the market value has
not been realized or tested by sale made, but that sale
cannot be made without abandoning the very purpose for
which the property is held.' '134
The writer holds no brief in defense of stock dividends from
unrealized fixed asset appreciation, but it is fair to notice that
some argument can be made for the view taken by the Uniform
Act. It is true that a stock dividend does not reduce the assets
of the corporation, but simply alters the degree of interest therein
among the various classes of shareholders. 135 This satisfies in some
measure the requirements of the view previously taken that the
reason for the law's interest m the source of dividend payments
lies in its desire to protect the creditor and the shareholder. A
dividend m par stock'36 requires a transfer of surplus to capital,
the capital stock of the corporation being increased by the aggre-
gate of the par value of the stock dividend. The surplus so
transferred is composed of unrealized appreciation, but the assets
available to the exisiting creditor after the dividend are no less
than those available before. The subsequent creditor will be mis-
taken if he thinks the corporation possesses realized assets equal
to the amount of its capital stock, but there seems to be as much
reason for accepting the valuations of the directors in this respect
as there is in connection with consideration received for shares
'= 256 U S. 377, 41 Sup. Ct. 528 (1921).
',Ibzd. U. S. 393, Sup. Ct. 532.
""The legal objection to dividends from unrealized appreciation of
assets does not apply with such force to stock dividends, since nothing Is
taken from the business. However, this violates conservative accounting
practice. " Sparger op. cit. supra, note 34, at 25. WWitlock v. Alexander
160 N. C. 465, 76 S. E. 538 (1912) Town v. Eisner 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup.
Ct. 158 (1918) Eisner v. Macomber supra, note 127 Williams v. W U.
Teleg. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 (1883) Hills, loc. cit. supra, note 128. And see
Hastings v. Internat'l. Paper Co., 187 App. Div 404, 175 N. Y. S. 815(1919) Sexton v. C. L. Perctval Co,, 189 Iowa 586, 177 N. W 83 (1920).
"'As to stock without par, see subdivision six (b), snfra.
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issued pursuant to subscription. 87 The shareholder is uninjured
because his capital contribution is still with the corporation. Prac-
tically speaking, it is doubtful if creditors extend appreciable credit
in reliance upon the rule that net corporate assets must equal the
capital stock. A rather pessimistic note is sounded by a recent
article-
"Cases are few in which either the creditors or the
stockholders succeed in forcing the management to main-
tain the capital. Profits in law depend to a high degree
upon the computations of accountants, and such computa-
tions rarely accord with economic fact. Stockholders and
creditors in relying upon an equality in value between
capital and capital stock may well heed the old rule of
'caveat emptor' ,,138
If the Uniform Act is proper in allowing stock dividends out
of unrealized appreciation of fixed assets, it should certainly be
a requirement that the appreciated value be genuine and of a
reasonably permanent type. If conservatism be overthrown in
favor of increased valuations based on transitory fluctuations of
the market, there seems little to say in justification of stock divi-
dends from such source. The ultimate responsibility for the
exactment of such a prerequisite lies peculiarly within the province
of the courts.
We now shift, to a discussion of the availability of unrealized
profits on current assets for dividend purposes. While subdi-
vision four imposes no limitations on such a source for either cash
or stock dividends, subdivision five adequately .covers the field inso-
far as cash dividends are concerned, and our inquiry in that
respect will be postponed until discussion of that subdivision. But
a search of other portions of Section 24 fails to reveal language
limiting payment of stock dividends to the unrealized apprecia-
tion of fixed assets, as contrasted to unrealized profit on current
assets. There is no subdivision to perform for stock dividends
I Section 17* "For the purpose of determining whether shares have
been fully paid for in order to fix the extent of the outstanding obligation
of a shareholder to the corporation with respect to such shares, the
following valuations shall be conclusive; (a) the valuation placed by
tle incorporators, the shareholders or the directors, as the case may be,
upon the consideration other than cash with which the subscriptions
for shares are made payable; (b) the valuation placed by the board of
directors upon the corporate assets in lestimating the surplus to be
transferred to capital as payment for shares to be allotted as stock divi-
dends." Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 3803-17 Pierce's Code (1933) sec. 4592-47.
L" Krauss, op. cit. supra, note 13, at 215.
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the service that subdivision five performs for cash dividends.
There seems good reason why stock dividends of this nature
should be made unlawful. At the outset it must be remembered
that allowance of stock dividends from unrealized fixed asset
appreciation is itself an exception to the accepted fundamental
that all dividends be based on realities and not expectations, and
that even this deviation has been, as we have seen, the subject of
criticism. Next, there is an inherent difference between fixed
and current assets that justifies a distinction in treating with their
unrealized increases in value. It is well stated by Mr. Berle and
Mr. Fisher
"The difference in quality between a fixed and a current
asset suggests that more liberty ought to be allowed the
practice of depicting the unrealized appreciation of a
fixed asset than of a current asset, on the theory that the
very nature of a current asset contemplates its converti-
bility into cash within a limited period. Accordingly,
there would seem little ground for giving any indication
whatsoever of an unrealized appreciation to current assets
-let the deed of conversion tell its own story ,u19
A close reading of the material adjacent to the quotation from
Mr. Weiner and Mr. Bonbright supra, stating that the Uniform
Act adopted pre-existing law re stock dividends, discloses that
they were discussing stock dividends from unrealized fixed asset
appreciation. They say
"There seems to be a consensus of opinion that a stock
dividend is a proper device for recognizing and passing
on to the shareholders the benefit of unrealized appre-
ciation in fixed assets.'140
Therefore their statement may not be taken as secondary authority
for the proposition that the law before the Uniform Act sanc-
tioned stock dividends from unrealized profits on current assets.
This criticism, of course, does not extend to accrued unrealized
profits on current assets. They are expressly made available for
even cash dividends by subdivision five, snfra, and, a fortor, are
proper for stock dividends.
It is interesting to note that two recently enacted state codes
are not in agreement upon the subject of stock dividends from
,19 Op. cit. supra, note 5, at 592.
1'0 Op. cit. supra, note 47, at 981.
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unrealized appreciation. California does not permit stock divi-
dends on any unrealized appreciation, either of current or fixed
assets, while Illinois allows them on both. 4'
SUBDISION FIvE
The fundamental requirement of subdivision five is that unreal-
ized profits on current assets shall not be used as a base for cash
dividends, although, as will develop later, some exceptions are
allowed. There is no question of the soundness of this principle,
nor of its existence in the law prior to the Uniform Act.142 As
has been said :143
"One cannot avoid the impression that the real reason
(and a sound one) for completely excluding unrealized
appreciation from income statements, and for admitting
it grudgingly, if at all, to balance sheets, is the fear of
human frailty Revising values upward is unduly easy
where the revision is put to no pragmatic test such as a
sale. This failing seems to run through the legal deci-
sions as well as through accounting techmque. On this
aspect, the experience of both professions tends to con-
verge. ') 44
Part (a) of subdivision five provides
"Cash dividends shall not be paid out of surplus due to or
rising from (a) any profit on treasury shares before re-
sale."
This requires treasury shares to be valued as an asset 4 5 at the cost
at which they were acquired by the corporation, subject, of course,
to be devalued in accordance with provisions of subdivision three.
Thus, shares acquired by gift are assets of no value for dividend
purposes. Shares upon which there remains an unpaid subscrip-
tion are not treasury shares, since, by Section 22,146 the corporation
"' Loc. cit. supra, note 14.
2 Hastings v. Internat'Z. Paper Co., supra, note 135, at 175 N. Y. S. 825,
Marks v. Monroe Co. Permanent Savngs & Loan Assoc., 52 N. Y. St. Rep.
451, 22 N. Y. S. 589 (1889). Cf. Hutchnson v. Curtiss, 45 Misc. 484, 92
N. Y. S. 70 (1904).
m Berle and Fisher, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 593.
"This statement was made in connection with both current and fixed
assets and so is properly considered in the discussion under subdivision
four re stock dividends, supra.
"'5Assuming that treasury stock is an. asset, as was argued under
subdivision three.
" Section 22: "If a shareholder be indebted to the corporation on
account of unpaid subscriptions for shares, it shall have a lien upon such
shares for such indebtedness. If such indebtedness is not paid after
demand made upon reasonable notice, the corporation may sell the
shares at public auction. " Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 3803-22; Pierce's Code
(1933) sec. 4592-52.
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only has a lien upon such shares to the amount of the indebted-
ness of the shareholder. Cases allowing unrealized profits on
shares seized under the forfeiture provision to be regarded as a
dividend source 7 are therefore not authority for the assumption
that the pre-existing law is altered by this section.
By virtue of part (b) of subdivision five
"Cash dividends shall not be paid out of surplus due to
or arising from (b) any unrealized profits due to increase
in valuation of inventories before sale."
This means that items of inventory axe to be carried as an asset
at their cost of acquisition, subject to reduction in accordance
with subdivision three, and are not to be valued at a greater fig-
ure even though a present sale would realize a larger sum. Effect
is thus given to the usual accounting practice of evaluating stock
in trade at "cost or market, whichever is lower," which, as pre-
viously stated, has received legal sanction. There is no question
of the soundness of this provision.
Parts (c) and (d) of subdivision five lend themselves to dis-
cussion together by reason of their similarity They are
"Cash dividends shall not be paid out of surplus due to
or arising from (c) the unaccrued portion of unrealized
profits on notes, bonds, or obligations for the payment of
money purchased or acquired at a discount unless such
notes, bonds, or obligations are readily marketable, in
which case they may be taken at their actual market
value, or (d) the unaccrued or unearned portion of any
unrealized profit in any form whatevger, whether in
form of notes, bonds, obligations for the payment of
money, installment sales, credits or otherwise."
The wording of these provisions imposes a modification upon the
rule of subdivision four (a) that cash dividends may not be paid
from unrealized appreciation of fixed assets. As noted previously,
the accountant classifies a debt obligation as a fixed or current
asset in accordance with its particular nature and the purpose
for which it is held. In other words, an obligation is not inher-
ently a fixed or a current asset, but may be either. Subdivision
four laid down the rule that cash dividends can never be paid
from unrealized appreciation of fixed assets, though stock divi-
dends can. But parts (c) and (d) of subdivision five expressly
", For example, see Gratz v. Redd, supra, note 76, dictum at 187.
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allow cash dividends from the accrued portion of unrealized profit
on notes, bonds, or obligations for the payment of money There
is at once apparent a conflict between the two subdivisions, since
in many instances a note or a bond or some other obligation for
the payment of money should be classified as a fixed asset. By
the rule of statutory construction which allows the particular to
control the general the result should be that the types of assets
listed m parts (c) and (d) are not contemplated by Section 24
of the Act as being fixed assets insofar as cash dividends are
concerned, or, alternatively, that unrealized appreciation of this
particular kind of fixed assets may give rise to legal cash dim-
dends in spite of the provisions of subdivision four. The fact
that the other parts of subdivision five deal with current assets
would indicate that the first of the alternatives was the proper
one. On the other hand, less violence is done to accounting con-
ceptions if the second view be adopted. At any rate, it is to be
noticed that the subdivision imbues investments with some of the
attributes of a current asset which are denied to other fixed
assets.
The combined effect of parts (c) and (d) is first, cash divi-
dends can be paid from the accrued portion of unrealized profits
on notes, bonds, obligations for the payment of money, installment
sales, credits or otherwise; second, cash dividends can not be paid
from the unaccrued portion of unrealized profit on any of these
items except notes, bonds or obligations for the payment of money,
and cash dividends can be paid on the unaccrued portion of un-
realized profit of these if they (1) were purchased or acquired
at a discount, and (2) are readily marketable.
Parts (o) and (d) are, perhaps, sound insofar as they allow
accrued but unrealized profits to be a source of cash dividends.
In this they depart from the theme of the balance of Section 24,
which refuses to recognize any type of unrealized appreciation or
profit as available for cash dividend purposes. Accrued revenue
is revenue which has been earned from the standpoint of time
elapsed and performed.'48 Such items may be due and legally
enforcible,1 49 or they may be unmatured and therefore not suscep-
tible of present collection. 50 It is easier to justify dividends from
the first type of accrual than from the last. Matured and there-
"' Paton, op. cit. supra note 48, at 276.
, 2 Kester, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 183.
' Paton, op. cit. supra, note 48, at 276.
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fore legally realizable claims for money are a sufficiently sound
asset when it is borne in mind that those which are of doubtful
collectibility from a practical standpoint have been weeded out
by operation of subdivision three-in fact, proper accounting would
disregard such claims even if there were no subdivision three. 5 '
The maturity of the claims renders them certain as to amount
and thus the danger of overvaluation is avoided. Moreover, there
seems to be no incentive to postpone realization in such cases-
indeed, the opposite is true-and therefore it is reasonably certain
that such assets will be reduced to cash in hand as soon as expe-
dient. Accounts and bills receivable are in the nature of an accrued
and matured claim, and there is no doubt of their availability for
dividend purposes. 5 2 But all of these arguments are not applicable
to the unmatured accrual and the propriety of their use as a divi-
dend fund is therefore more questionable. In view of the fact that
accountants recognize both types of accrued claims as assets,
1 1
however, this provision of these parts of Section 24 seems defen-
sible.
There are instances in which courts have refused to recognize
an accrued but unmatured debt claim as grounds for dividend pay-
ment. Perhaps the most striking example is that of People v. San
Francisco Savings Union."4 In that case directors of the bank
counted as profit interest which was due on mortgages held by
the bank, but which, instead of being paid, had been added to the
principal and bore interest with it, as was provided by the agree-
ment of the parties. It was conceded that the mortgaged prop-
erty was ample to secure the increased principal. The directors
also regarded as profit the accrued interest on United States Gov-
ernment bonds held by the bank. Under a statute which made
dividends unlawful unless paid out of "surplus profits" the court
enjoined payment of a dividend from these sources.
Marks v Monroe County Permanent Savings and Loan Associa-
tioWn' 5 deserves comment. Members of the Association bid for
loans. The successful bidder gave a bond and mortgage to the
Association and received cash to the amount of the face of the
bond less interest for the term and the premium he had bid. A
" 2 Kester, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 183.
152 Supra, note 95.
53Weier and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 971, 976, but see
n. p. 971. Paton, op. cit. supra, note 48, at 276, 2 Kester, op. cit. supra,
note 12, at 183; Hatfield, op. cit. svpra, note 62, at 257.
5' 72 Cal. 199, 13 Pac. 498 (1887).
151 Sipra, note 142.
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shareholder brought suit to compel payment of a dividend, claim-
ing the difference between the face of the bond and the amount
advanced to be profit. Tlns the court demed, saying-
"This mortgage has become an asset of the company,
and when it it is paid the company will have made a
profit by the transaction. But I do not think that the
profit can be said to be earned until the transaction is
closed and the money is in the treasury
A note comments on the case
"In a recent N. Y. case, premiums earned but not re-
ceived by a building and loan society were not allowed to
be considered [for dividends] The case does not
seem conclusive so far as debts that have matured are con-
cerned, since the debts there involved were due at a future
date. ' 5 ,6
Query whether the premiums were even earned. Another article
observes in regard to the case.15
"Some doubt is cast upon the propriety of including
accrued but unmatured interest as profit for dividend
purposes by two cases. -58 [There follows a discussion of
the facts and opinion in the Marks ease, with this con-
dlusion] The instant case was a case where the secured
debt claim had not only not been realized by a cash re-
ceipt, but had not even sustained an increase in unrealized
value. In other words, the growth in value of the loan
from the date of its negotiation to the date of its maturly
had not even accrued, to say nothing of its not having been
realized. "
As pointed out by the last two sentences of the last quotation, the
case was not one of accrued earnings at all, and it therefore is diffi-
cult to understand why the case may be used as authority for
attack even upon unmatured accrued claims.
There can be only one quarrel with the second rule effected by
(c) and (d), and that is that an exception was attached to it.
The case of E. L. Moore and Company v. Murchison, 59 dis-
cussed previously in another connection, is also pertinent here.
*6Note, 3 Brooklyn L. R. 91, at 97 (1933).
'Weiner and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 976.158 The second case is that of People v. S. F Savngs Unson, previously
discussed.
IrO Supra, note 97.
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Part of the "surplus" upon which the corporation based dividends
was created by purchasing the inventory of its bankrupt predeces-
sor and writing it on the books as an asset at the book value at
which it had been carried by the old corporation, which was far
in excess of the price paid by the successor corporation. The divi-
dend was held illegal, thus denying that the unrealized profit on
the merchandise was a dividend source.
The Washington case of Brenaman v. Whitehouse 50 is most in-
teresting. The opinion is not as full as it might be, but it and
the appeal briefs show the following facts pertinent to the instant
discussion The corporation of which defendants were trustees sold
A, B and C each fifty shares of its stock, for which it was paid in
full in cash at par. It was agreed that A, B and C could each
order work to be done for them by the corporation in its line of
business and that such work should be paid for one-half in cash
and one-half by a return to the corporation of its stock at an agreed
value somewhat in excess of par. At the time of the dividend in
question some work had been done for A, B and C, but not enough
to entitle the corporation to a return of its stock. The trustees
considered that fifty per cent of the work so done and to be done
was net profit, and, to quote the court, decided "that approximately
$1,000 thereof having been earned, the board of directors were
justified in treating all of it as having been earned, and declaring
a dividend in that amount." The dividend was held to be illegal,
although the decision was not based on the unrealized profit aspect
of the case, but on the fact that the corporation had trafficked in
its own stock and that "whereas the stock should have been out-
standing and its value in the treasury or in the assets of the
company, it was not outstanding, but was in the treasury of the
company, and its proceeds were divided among the three stock-
holders as dividends." What the Washington court would have
done if the latter ground had not been available is purely con-
jecture, but it is certain that the new law removes all doubt from a
similar case today
In Hutchtnson v. Curtis" a shareholder brought an action
against a director to recover an allegedly illegal dividend. Thf
dividend was partly based on a surplus created by anticipating
profits on orders on hand for future deliveries of malt and,
secondly, by an increase in the valuation of the company's supply
"'85 Wash. 355, 148 Pac. 24 (1915).
Supra, note 142.
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of malt. The court held that the first source was not proper,
saying.
C to calculate months in advance on the result of the
future transactions and on such calculations to declare
dividends, was to base such dividends on paper profits
and not on the surplus or net profits required by law
It does not seem to me that you can divide a hope
based on an expectation of a future delivery at a favor-
able price of what is not yet in existence."
But the second ground was held proper because defendant showed
a custom in the malting business to take into account the increase
in value resulting from an increase in bulk of the malt over the
bulk of the barley out of which the malt was produced. Were it
not for the special circumstances involved, the second point of
this case would be violative of the rule against unrealized profit.
The last branch of the httchrnson case illustrates one exception
recognized by accountants to their principle that unrealized ap-
preciation is not to be recognized. It is their practice to allow such
an appreciation to be shown if it results from a growth in quantity
or quality of the subject matter rather than from an increase in
value purely 162 It is conceivable that the courts will give force to
this exception on the ground that it is not within the prohibition
of parts (c) and (d), the rationale being that the growth is not
such an unrealized profit as is there contemplated but is, to the
contrary, analagous to a realized growth in value. Strength is
lent to this view by the fact that still another of the accountants'
exceptions is expressly recognized by the Uniform Act, namely,
that of accrued, though unrealized, profit.1 63
The cases just treated show the correctness of the second rule of
parts (c) and (d), but its exception seems to be indefensible. The
danger of allowing an increased value of current assets to be
treated as a gain for purposes of cash dividends without requiring
that the gain be accrued or be realized by sale is at once apparent.
It violates all the reason underlying restrictions placed upon
'G2 Other examples of the same exception are lumber and whiskey,
which actually grow in excellence with passage of time.
16 A third exception to the rule against recognition of unrealized ap-
preciation is that involved in businesses engaged in long-term construc-
tion under contract, in which it is the practice to periodically book the
then completed portion of the product as an asset at an amount equal to
the proportion the completed part bears to the whole, e. g. ships, build-
ings, etc. Weiner and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 970.
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problematical assets as a dividend source and apparently serves
no useful purpose that may offset this fault. One may imagine
the embarrassment of directors who had declared a dividend based
on the market value of their corporation's bonds in the summer of
1929 when the crash came a few months later. This part of the
Uniform Act is not designed to save directors such embarrassment
in the future.
There seems to be no saving grace in the fact that such pro-
cedure is available only in event the obligations are "readily
marketable." While this perhaps gives assurance that the obliga-
tions will be liquid, it by no means assures stability of price. In
Jennery v. Olmstead,16 " an oft-cited case when the problem of
unrealized appreciation is involved, the court remarked
"It is claimed that profits are substantially realized by
this appreciation in the value of government bonds, if the
bonds are unsold, just as much as if they were sold. If
unsold, it is said that the value of the bond is as well
known by a simple reference to the reports of the stock
market as it would be by an actual sale, and that if sold,
all that is got in exchange is another article, whose value
may also fluctuate from time to time, and hence there is no
sense in demanding an actual sale of the bond before
asserting a realization of profit. Nevertheless the bond
unsold is only called worth so many dollars, according to
the market price thereof, whereas the bond when sold has
actually brought so many dollars, and these dollars are
in money, which is a standard of value, made so by law,
and that money is now on hand."
Nor is it conceived how the fact of purchase at a discount can
operate to jnstify the exception.
SUBDIVISION Six
Subdivision six of Section 24 states
"Subject to the limitations contained in this section, a
dividend may be declared in shares of the corporation
whenever the board of directors so determine, provided
that (a) if the dividend is to be paid in shares having a
par value, the aggregate par value of such shares shall
not exceed the amount of that portion of the corpora-
tion's surplus which is transferred to capital as payment
for such shares, (b) if the dividend is paid in shares
having no par value, the number of such shares may be
fixed by the board of directors, (c) no dividend payable
, Supra, note 105.
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m shares of any class shall be paid to shareholders of any
other class unless the articles so provide or such payment
is authorized by the vote of the holders of a majority of
the shares of the class m which the payment is to be
made."
Part (a) is obviously proper and requires no comment. Refer-
ence to section one, subdivision ten (a),165 discloses that the
aggregate value of the par-value shares distributed by stock
dividend becomes a part of the capital stock.
Part (b) is not beyond question. As it stands it adds nothing
for the directors would certainly be empowered to fix the number
of no-par shares to be paid by way of stock dividend in the
absence of prohibitory provision. That which is really essential
in connection with dividends in no-par shares is amitted, namely,
a requirement that there be transferred to capital as-payment for
the shares a part of the corporation's surplus equal to the aggregate
of the value placed upon the no-par shares so divided.:" That such
action is contemplated by the Uniform Act may be implied from
section 23 167 and from the inclusion in the definition of capital
stock 168 "such assets as may have been transferred from surplus
upon the allotment of stock dividends in shares having no-par
value." If no such transfer is made there is room for strong
argument that the shares so issued are without consideration and
are, therefore, void.6 9 In Jorguson v. Apex Gold Mines Com-
pany,7 0 the Washington Supreme Court observed.
"This [the bond in suit] would mean the payment
back to the stockholder of the money he paid for his stock,
while permitting him to retain his stock as-fully paid, thus
leaving the issuance of the stock wholly unsupported by
any consideration, a direct conflict with the constitutional
provision. "171
The new California and Illinois Corporation Laws both require
such a transfer. 7 2 Distinction must be drawn, however, between
1 Set out supra, p. 69.
1,- See dictum in Joyce -v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29, 30
(1921).
107 Set out supra, p. 69.
10 See. 1, subdivision 10 (b), set out supra, p. 69.
1c1 Masterson, Consideration for Corporate Shares, 2 Idaho L. J. 75, at
108 (1932).
17074 Wash. 243, 247, 133 Pac. 465, 467 (1913).
"'Wash. Constitution, art 12, sec. 6.
11 Loc. cit. supra, note 14.
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issuing new shares by way of dividends and splitting up old
shares.
Like part (a), part (c) stands firmly upon its own feet. It
squares with the Washington Constitutional provision.
"The stock of corporations shall not be increased, except
in pursuance of a general law, nor shall any law authorize
the increase of stock, without the consent of the person
or persons holding the larger amount in value of the
stock ,,73
SUBDIVISION SEVEN
Subdivision seven of Section 24 embodies in the law the familiar
"1wasting assets" doctrine
"A corporation which owns wasting assets intended for
sale in the ordinary course of business, such as mines, or
oil or gas wells, or timber, or a corporation which owns
property having a limited life, such as a lease for a term
of years, or patents, need not deduct the depletion of such
assets by sale or lapse of time in the computation of the
fund available for dividends, and such a corporation may
pay dividends from the net profits arising from its
business without deduction of such depletion, subject,
however, to the rights of the shareholders of different
classes. '174
This provision does not give free hand to a corporation simply
because it deals in wasting assets, however. One limitation of
the doctrine is well shown by the case of Van Vleet v. Evangeline
Oil Company,17 5 which held that it did not justify payment of
dividends from the proceeds of oil that had been severed from the
ground before coming into the company's hands until proper al-
lowance for depletion was made. The English courts, which
created the doctrine, apply a second limitation. They distinguish
"circulating" capital of a corporation from "fixed" capital, ap-
plying the wasting assets exception to the latter but not to the
former. Thus, property permanently dedicated to the business
need not be replaced, but assets of a liquid and circulating nature
are not excepted from the general rule.' This idea is incorporated
'1'Supra, note 171.
"' The words "or timber" are not in the Uniform Business Corpora-
tion Act, having been added by the Washington Legislature.
"'129 La. 406, 56 So. 343 (1911).
17 Verner v. Gen'l & Oommtercuzl Inv. Trust (1894) 2 Ch. 239" Am-
monia Soda Co. v. Chamberlam (1918) 1 Ch. 266.
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in subdivision seven in that it requires depletion reserve for all
assets of a corporation other than its wasting assets.
The doctrine had its birth in the case of Lee v. Neuchatel
Asphalte Company'77 and it has not been free of criticism since. 7 8
It is said that some of the remarks in the Lee case were not
necessary to its decision, ,and that its rule has been applied to
companies whose assets are not of a wasting kand.17 9 Indeed, in
the later English case of Bond v. Barrow Hfaematite Steel Com-
pany the judge said.
cc the plaintiffs really relied on Lee v. Neuchatel
Asphalzte Company as an authority for a universal
negative, namely, 'that no company owning wasting prop-
erty need ever create a depreciation fund' In my opinion,
that is not the true result of the decision. It must be
remembered that in that case there had been no loss of
assets. The company's assets were larger than at its
formation, and the court decided nothing more than the
particular proposition that some companies with wasting
assets need have no depreciation fund. 8 0
Other writers say
"It is generally stated by the text writers that the same
doctrine has been accepted in this country This state-
ment puts the situation somewhat too strongly, for most
of the cases cited in support of the wasting asset doctrine
are either mere dicta or else are not concerned with the
problems of dividends. Quite recently the wasting asset
principle has been specifically sanctioned by statutory
amendment to the corporation laws of some states,i''
the form of the amendments being, in the opinion of the
present writers, extremely unfortunate and danger-
ous. 22 182
The grounds of criticism have been that the doctrine misleads
shareholders who, unaware of the special practice open to their
corporation, think their dividends leave assets owned by the cor-
poration equal to the capital stock, and act upon that belief to
I"41 Ch. Div. 1 (1889). But Fletcher, op. cit. supra, note 8, sec.
5347, credits Victor Morawetz with creation of the doctrine "without
citation of authority."113 Levy, Purchase by a Corp. of its Own Shares, 79 U. Pa. L. R. 45
(1930) Note, 3 Brooklyn L. R. 91, at 100 (1933) Note, 40 Harv. L. R.
318 (1926) Weiner and Bonbright op. cit. supra, note 104, at 355.
' Levy, op. cit. supra, note 178, at 63.
180 Supra, note 82, at 367.
" Citing Del. and Ohio Codes and Uniform Business Corporation Act.
"'Weiner and Bonbright, op. cit. supra, note 104, at 356.
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their detriment, and also that such a corporation should preserve
its capital for the purpose of acquiring new properties to replace
those wasted. There is force to these arguments, but they are not
necessarily conclusive. As one judge has said, wasting assets com-
panies "live by dying,""83 and one must bear in mind that there
is an element of uniqueness in such things as mines and patents-a
directorate might be unable to find a valid replacement for their
diminishing property even though their reserve for this purpose
was ample. Surely there is no reason why the capital should be
returned in lump sum when such an impasse arrives rather than
being distributed in proportion to the use of the asset. The
doctrine overcomes a second practical difficulty in that it does
not require the determination of the amount of gas or ore re-
maining in the earth, which must be an estimation at the best.""
Lastly, many businesses of the wasting asset type carry on exten-
sive search for new patentable devices and physical properties
and this in some degree compensates for the lack of depletion
reserves.
It seems that adoption of the wasting asset exception in England
might be defended and its adaptability to American corporation
finance denied upon the ground of the variance in the respective
conceptions of capital. As stated in a learned article by Nathan
Isaacs,18 5 England adopts what he styles the res conception of
fixed capital, 8 6 under which the "principal may possibly be con-
sidered as increasing in terms of money value without yielding
any income corresponding to this increase, or diminishing without
adversely affecting income." Says he
"This is in sharp contrast with the American account-
ancy which puts all that a corporation has and owes into a
single balance. The words of Lord Justice Lindley in
Verner v. General & Commereial Investment Trust 8 7
must seem strange to an American accountant. 'The
law is much more accurately expressed by saying that
dividends cannot be paid out of capital, than by saying
that they can only be paid out of profits. The last ex-
pression leads to the inference that the capital must al-
1 Pope, Dist. J., in Stratton's Independence Ltd. v. Howbert, 207 Fed.
419 (D. C. Colo., 1912).
"' This observation, however, applies with less force to patents, copy-
rights, and timber.
"Isaacs, Principal, Quantum or Res? 46 Harv. L. R. 776 (1933).
' "Fixed" as distinguished from "circulating" capital, which distinc
tion has been previously discussed.
17 Supra, note 176.
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ways be kept up and be represented by assets which, if
sold, would produce it, and this is more than is required
by law. Perhaps the shortest way of expressing the dis-
tinction which I am endeavoring to explain is to say that
fixed capital may be sunk and lost, and yet that the
excess of current receipts over current payments may be
divided.' In other words, the fixed capital is very much
like the land, the fluctuating value of which does not
enter into current income accounting. American ac-
countancy, on the other hand, leaves no room, in theory,
for a fluctuation in the value of capital without affect-
ing for better or worse the funds out of which dividends
may be paid. This view is related to the American legal
doctrine that depleted capital must be made good before
dividends may be paid." 18
On the whole, adoption of the wasting assets exception seems
justifiable in view of the argument that may be made for it
and the respectable number of cases which, if they be not con-
clusive, indicate that the American trend is strongly toward the
principle the exception adopts.189
The subdivision requires that reserves be set up sufficient to
cover outstanding obligations to shareholders of different classes.
In this it adopts the rule of Wittenburg v. Federal Mining and
Smelting Company.'90  In that case plaintiff shareholders of a
mining company were entitled upon dissolution to payment for
their stock at par value plus accumulated dividends, and the court
enjoined the payment of dividends until a reserve sufficient for
this purpose was created. This result is unquestionably to be
preferred over the rule established by the case of Mellonv . Missis-
sippi 'Wire Glass Company' which, on identical facts, reached
the opposite result.'9 2
CONCLUSIO
It has appeared best to place conclusions where pertinent to the
discussion throughout the body of the article, rather than to re-
Is' Isaacs, op. cit. supra, note 185, at 778.
""Boothe v. Sumrit Coal Mining Co., 55 Wbsh. 167, 104 Pac. 207
(1909) Mezion v. Miss. Wire Glass Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 498, 78 Atl. 710
(1910) People ex. rel. United. Verde Copper Co. v. Roberts, 156 N. Y.
585, 51 N. E. 293 (1898) Excelsior Water & Miming Co. v. Pierce, 90
Calif. 131, 27 Pac. 44 (1891) Dealer's Granite Corp. v. Faubion, supra,
note 123; Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, supra, note 183;
11 Fletcher, op. cit. supra, note 8, sec. 5347 2 Cook op. cit. supra, note 34.
see. 546. Cf. Crocker v. Barteau, 212 Mo. 359, 110 S. W 1062 (1908)
Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., supra, note 175.
10 Supra, note 37.
'
9 Supra, note 189.
101 Cf. Excelsior Water & Mining Co. v. Pierce, supra, note 189.
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serve them for enumeration in the concluding paragraphs. But it
is not amiss to again express the conviction that Section 24 is a far
step in the proper direction upon the subject of legal regulation of
corporate dividends. If, in the process of interpreting this Act
and of making those additions and alterations which will be shown
desirable by experience, the courts and the legislature are guided
by recourse to approved accounting practices and to the interpre-
tations given similar laws in other states, a sound dividend law
will have been established.
